Strict Liability vs Absolute Liability: Meaning, Cases with Exceptions

Strict Liability

In the law of torts, liability is generally based on fault, such as intention, negligence, or lack of reasonable care. However, there are certain situations where a person may be made liable even without proving any fault on his part. This is known as no-fault liability.

Strict liability is one such principle. It means that a person may be held liable for damage caused by a dangerous thing brought or kept by him, even though he neither intended to cause harm nor acted negligently. In some cases, he may have taken reasonable precautions to prevent the harm, yet liability may still arise.

The reason is that the law places special responsibility on a person who introduces or keeps something hazardous or unusually dangerous on his land. If that thing escapes and causes damage to another person, he may be liable simply because he created or maintained that source of danger.

Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) : Classical Source of Strict Liability

The foundation of the rule of strict liability is found in the leading English case of Rylands v. Fletcher. The rule was first stated by Blackburn J. and was later approved by the House of Lords. He observed:

“A person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril; and if he does not, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.”

In Rylands v. Fletcher, the defendant wanted to supply water to his mill and therefore got a reservoir constructed on his land through independent contractors. Beneath the site of the reservoir, there were old and unused mine shafts. The contractors failed to notice these shafts and did not block them properly.

When the reservoir was filled with water, the water escaped through those shafts and flooded the plaintiff’s coal mines situated on the adjoining land. The defendant himself was not aware of the existence of the shafts. He had not personally acted negligently, though the contractors had failed to take proper care.

Despite the absence of personal negligence on the part of the defendant, he was held liable. The court reasoned that the defendant had brought and accumulated a large quantity of water on his land for his own purpose. Since water escaped and caused damage to the plaintiff’s property, liability arose under the rule of strict liability.

Essential Ingredients of Strict Liability

1. Dangerous thing

One of the essential conditions for applying the rule of strict liability is that the defendant must have brought or accumulated on his land something which is likely to cause harm if it escapes. The thing need not be dangerous in every situation. Its dangerous character may depend upon its quantity, nature, place, or manner of storage. For example, a small quantity of water kept for ordinary domestic use is not dangerous. But a large body of water stored in a reservoir may become dangerous because, if it escapes, it can flood neighbouring land and cause serious damage. Similarly, ordinary use of fire, gas, or electricity may not by itself attract strict liability. But when such things are stored, handled, or accumulated in a manner that creates special risk to others, the rule may apply.

Examples: Large quantity of water in a reservoir, Gas, Electricity, Explosives, Toxic chemicals, Noxious fumes etc.

2. Escape

There must be an escape of the dangerous thing from the defendant’s land to a place outside his occupation or control.

If the damage is caused within the defendant’s premises and there is no escape, the rule does not apply. In Read v. J. Lyons & Co. Ltd. (1947), an explosion took place in a munitions factory, injuring the plaintiff who was inside the premises. There was no escape of the dangerous thing outside the premises and hence the rule of strict liability did not apply.

In Ponting v. Noakes, the plaintiff’s horse reached over the boundary fence and ate poisonous leaves from a yew tree growing on the defendant’s land. The horse died. The defendant was not liable because there was no escape. The poisonous thing, namely the yew tree, remained within the defendant’s land. The horse itself went into contact with it by stretching across the boundary.

3. Non-natural use of land

One of the essential conditions of the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher is that the defendant must have made a non-natural use of land. It means that the defendant’s use of land must be special, unusual, extraordinary, or dangerous, and not merely an ordinary use connected with normal domestic or everyday life. The use must be such that it creates an increased risk of harm to others.

In Rylands v. Fletcher, collecting a large quantity of water in a reservoir was treated as non-natural use because such accumulation created a special danger to adjoining property if the water escaped. However, storing or using water for ordinary household purposes is a natural use of land.

In Rickards v. Lothian (1913), water overflowed from a wash-basin because an unknown person maliciously blocked the pipe and left the tap open. The defendant was held not liable because ordinary water supply in a building is a natural use of land. The case clarified that strict liability does not apply to ordinary domestic use of land.

In Noble v. Harrison, the branch of a non-poisonous tree growing on the defendant’s land suddenly broke due to a hidden defect and damaged the plaintiff’s vehicle. The defendant was not held liable because growing ordinary trees is a natural use of land.

However, if a person keeps something unusually dangerous, such as poisonous trees, explosives, industrial chemicals, or a large artificial reservoir, it may amount to non-natural use.

4. Damage

There must be actual damage caused to the plaintiff as a natural consequence of the escape.

Important Exceptions to Strict Liability

1. Act of God / Vis Major

It refers to an extraordinary natural event which is so unexpected and irresistible that no reasonable human foresight or care could have prevented it. The event must be caused by natural forces alone, without human intervention.

Thus, if the dangerous thing escapes because of an exceptional natural force, and not because of the defendant’s negligence, the defendant may avoid liability.

In Nichols v. Marsland, the defendant had created artificial lakes by damming a natural stream. Due to an extraordinary rainfall, described as the heaviest in human memory, the water level rose abnormally. The embankments, though strong enough for ordinary rainfall, gave way, and the escaping water destroyed the plaintiff’s bridges.

The court held that the defendant was not liable because the damage was caused by an Act of God. There was no negligence, and the rainfall was so exceptional that it could not reasonably have been anticipated.

Examples of Act of God:

Extraordinary flood, Unprecedented storm, Exceptional earthquake, Extremely unusual rainfall etc.

2. Act of stranger

If the escape of the dangerous thing is caused by a stranger over whom the defendant has no control, and the act was not reasonably foreseeable, the defendant may not be liable.

In Rickards v. Lothian, unknown persons blocked the waste pipe of a wash-basin and left the tap open, causing water to overflow and damage the plaintiff’s goods. The defendant was not liable because the damage was caused by the malicious act of strangers.

However, this defence is not available where the act of the stranger was reasonably foreseeable or where the defendant could have prevented the resulting damage by taking proper precautions.

In M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumar, a live electric wire had snapped and fallen on a rainwater-covered road. A cyclist came into contact with it and died of electrocution. The Electricity Board argued that the wire might have snapped due to the act of a stranger attempting to steal electricity. The Supreme Court rejected this defence and held the Board liable. The Court observed that electricity is a dangerous commodity, and those who supply it have a high duty to ensure safety. Even if the wire had snapped due to a stranger’s act, such a possibility ought to have been foreseen and proper safety measures should have existed to prevent injury.

3. Plaintiff’s own default

Plaintiff’s own default is a defence to strict liability. If the damage is caused because of the plaintiff’s own act, fault, or intrusion into the defendant’s property, the defendant cannot be made liable under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.

In Ponting v. Noakes, the plaintiff’s horse entered the defendant’s land and ate leaves of a poisonous tree growing there. The horse died. The defendant was held not liable because the damage was caused due to the horse’s intrusion into the defendant’s land.

The rule of strict liability did not apply for two reasons:

• First, the damage occurred because of the plaintiff’s own default, as his horse had trespassed into the defendant’s land.
• Second, there was no escape of the dangerous thing from the defendant’s land. The poisonous leaves remained on the defendant’s property, and the plaintiff’s horse went there and consumed them.

4. Consent / Common Benefit

The defence of volenti non fit injuria may apply to the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher where the plaintiff has consented to the accumulation or use of the dangerous thing.

Such consent may be express or implied. Implied consent is usually found where the source of danger exists for the common benefit of both the plaintiff and the defendant.

In Carstairs v. Taylor, the plaintiff occupied the ground floor of a building, while the defendant occupied the upper floor. Water stored on the upper floor leaked and damaged the plaintiff’s goods. There was no negligence on the part of the defendant. The court held that the defendant was not liable because the water system was maintained for the common benefit of both parties.

Thus, where the plaintiff has consented to the existence of the source of danger, especially when it is maintained for common benefit, strict liability will not arise unless negligence is proved.

5. Statutory authority

If the act is expressly or impliedly authorised by statute, and the defendant has acted without negligence within the scope of that authority, liability may be excluded.

Absolute Liability: Shift from Strict Liability

Absolute liability is a special rule developed by the Supreme Court of India for enterprises engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous activities.

The rule of absolute liability was evolved by the Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987), popularly known as the Oleum Gas Leak Case.

The case arose when oleum gas leaked from Shriram Food and Fertilizer Industries, Delhi, affecting several persons and allegedly causing the death of an advocate. The matter reached the Supreme Court through a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution.

Principle Laid Down in M.C. Mehta v UOI (Oleum Gas Leak Case)

• The Supreme Court held that where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity, and harm results to anyone due to an accident in the operation of that activity, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all affected persons.
• Such liability is not subject to any exceptions available under Rylands v. Fletcher.
• The Court further held that such an enterprise owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results from its hazardous activity.
• The Court felt that the old English rule of strict liability laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher was not sufficient for modern industrial society. That rule was developed in the nineteenth century, when science, technology, and hazardous industries had not developed to the present extent.
• Chief Justice P.N. Bhagwati observed that law must grow with changing social and economic conditions. Indian courts should not feel bound by English common law where Indian conditions require a stronger rule. Therefore, the Supreme Court evolved the doctrine of absolute liability.

Reasons Given by the Supreme Court in Oleum Gas Leak Case

• Social Obligation of Hazardous Industries

An enterprise carrying on hazardous activity for profit must bear the cost of any harm caused by that activity. The loss suffered by victims should be treated as part of the business cost or overhead expense.

• Better Capacity to Prevent Harm

The enterprise has the resources, technical knowledge, and financial capacity to discover, prevent, and guard against hazards. Therefore, it is more just to place liability on the enterprise rather than on innocent victims.

Compensation Must Have Deterrent Effect

The Supreme Court also held that compensation must be related to the magnitude and financial capacity of the enterprise.

The larger and more prosperous the enterprise, the greater should be the amount of compensation, so that it has a deterrent effect and encourages higher safety standards.

In Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India (Bhopal Gas Tragedy Case), the disaster showed the devastating consequences of hazardous industrial activities and the inadequacy of traditional legal principles in dealing with mass industrial harm. The Supreme Court in this case approved a settlement of 470 million US dollars for the victims.

Applicability of principle of absolute liability in environmental pollution

In Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, the Supreme Court applied the principle of absolute liability in the context of environmental pollution. The Supreme Court held that industries engaged in hazardous activities are liable for the damage caused by them. The Court also applied the polluter pays principle, meaning that the person who pollutes must bear the cost of removing the pollution and restoring the environment.

Conclusion

The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher was suitable for an older and simpler society, but it was inadequate for modern industrial India. The Supreme Court, therefore, evolved a stronger rule of Absolute liability.

The doctrine of absolute liability ensures that enterprises engaged in hazardous activities cannot escape responsibility by pleading absence of negligence or traditional exceptions. It places public safety above industrial profit and reflects the Indian constitutional commitment to life, health and environmental protection under Article 21.